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The reforms are needed to ensure financial viability on the one hand, and to achieve greater justice, on the other hand. 
Parametric reforms are not enough. A paradigm shift is needed in the pension system! To that end, the insurance paradigm in 
the state pension system must be replaced with an investment paradigm, and, to be more specific, to the paradigm of investing 
into human capital. We don’t save for our older selves, we repay our predecessors what they invested in us. Our work pensions 
would be complemented by the second channel payable based on children or based on the voluntary pension fund. The latter 
should be chosen by those who do not or could not have children. If they do, eventually, have children, they can change to 
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The pension system established in the socialist 
era, which was built on state care for forty years 
instead of the former insurance principle, was 
overthrown by the increasing individualism 
around 1990 and the period following it. The 
system tried to return to some form of insurance 
basis. At the same time, social conditions went 
through a fundamental change compared to 
previous eras. The size of hidden state debt 
existing in the form of pension commitments 
was becoming more and more threatening. 
The pension reform seemed unavoidable in 
the long run, for financing reasons alone. The 
equilibrium of the system could only been 
maintained with a high level of social security 
contributions. The reform-communist elite 
was already contemplating the capitalization 
of the social security (ss) system before 1990 
so that it could fulfil its future obligations. 
POsT 1990
unfortunately, capitalization did not take 
place during the later privatization. 
The sizable absence of the pension system 
in the ‘90s (and, therefore, the necessity of a 
reform) was, in a large part, the result of the 
fact that the totality of pension expenditures 
was increased by early retirements and (formal) 
declarations of disability, as a major proportion E-mail address:  evmkabor@gmail.com
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of the mass unemployment was 'solved' this 
way during the Antall-government.
The head of the Hungarian social security 
system appointed upon the regime change 
talked about the need for a substantial reform 
(one that would take into consideration the 
children raised) at a social committee hearing 
in the Parliament in 1991-1992. His proposal 
was based on the idea that this cost should also 
be recognized when determining pensions. 
According to his proposal, the allowance 
should be somehow connected to certain levels 
of education provided to the children. The 
pension reform proposal received vehement 
opposition. The reform took a completely 
different direction. 
one of the reform proposals wanted 
to redeem state care with small grassroot 
communities following the example set by the 
french 'mutualite', i.e. voluntary insurance 
funds. The act on voluntary pension funds was 
adopted in 1993, for the purpose of additional 
insurance. In 1993, the social security system 
was divided into two, and the local governments 
of pension and health insurance funds were 
established. such local governments, however, 
did not brought about notable improvements 
in financial management –  quite the contrary. 
The costs doubled.
The approach towards the pension reform 
further changed in the second cycle following 
the regime change (1994-1998). In line with 
the recommendations of international financial 
organisations, the new government aimed to 
establish the second pillar: the funded scheme. 
(The same as in other central-European 
countries, including, amongst others, Poland.) 
This meant a partial return to the funded 
scheme paradigm, with, however, the division 
of contributions. This step was subsequently 
criticised by several experts (Bartha, Tóth, 
2013). As far as we are concerned: we have 
always opposed it. According to József Botos, 
the transition to the funded scheme does 
not constitute a major reform, it is only 
a financial engineering maneuver (Botos, 
1998.) Therefore, in Hungarian literature, 
independently from international literature, 
simply based on the Hungarian statistical 
figures, the need for taking children into 
account in the pension system was already 
clearly formulated more than twenty years ago 
(Botos, 1998; pp. 47-48).
The government of the second cycle, 
however, did not rely on this approach at all. 
In 1998, the sources withdrawn or 'redirected' 
from the existing system became the basis of 
the second pillar in the mandatory private 
pension fund system. These sources had to 
be compensated. This resulted a deficit in the 
government budget, which had to support 
the state social security system. The founding 
fathers of the reform, Péter Mihályi and Csaba 
László hoped that the deficit would somehow 
be evened out from other sources in the 
budgets. They also acknowledged the futility 
of this later on themselves. As they put it: 
'Looking back from today, this was a reasonable 
yet bad compromise' (Mihályi, 2018).
Therefore, a part of the needs for financing 
was caused by the reform itself. The funds, 
as we have already mentioned before, were 
operating a lot more expensively than the state 
system. (While between 1990 and 1993, the 
operating cost of the unified social security 
system was 1.5%, that of private pension funds 
amounted to 6-7% later on. Practically, they 
took a substantial part of payments for their 
own costs and managers’ salaries. Based on 
the scheme, the first group of retiring people 
received not more, but even less pension after 
10 years compared to the scenario if they 
stayed in the state system.)
The matter of further developing the 
pension system remained on the agenda. The 
issue was analysed by the so-called Pension 
and old-age Roundtable established by the 
government. (Holtzer ed., 2010) In his study 
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published in the summary volume, pension 
expert Rudolf Borlói pointed out that based on 
international experience, the most reasonable 
pension system is the point system existing in 
Germany. However, a major part of Hungarian 
opinions saw the long-term solution in the 
continued liberalisation of the mandatory 
pension fund regulation, and voted for this 
option. 
In october, 2010, the authors of this study 
once again stated their position of the need 
to return to the state pension system: to a 
reformed, point system-based version (Botos 
J., Botos K., 2010). (Rudolf Borlói also made 
a similar statement later on in 2016.) In any 
case, based on the decision of the government 
the second pillar ceased as of January 1, 
2012. The majority of contribution-payers 
were returned to the so-called state pension 
system. (This phenomenon is far from 
being a Hungarian particularity. After the 
financial crisis, a similar process took place 
even in chile, which was considered a model 
country.) 
The assets piled up in funds were taken by 
the state and the majority was used for debt 
repayment. The communication of this step, 
however, was not sufficiently elaborated. Many 
people complained, not understanding that 
the money was never really theirs: although 
the reform made them owners in the funded 
pillar, the state forgot to add that the citizens 
are indebted to the previous generation with 
the sums withdrawn from the state system. 
But neither they, nor the previous legislators 
considered the payment of contributions what 
it truly is: repayment to the generation of the 
parents.
Amongst the changes introduced by the 
governments after 2010, the one that had the 
largest impact was the introduction of 65 year 
retirement age. Although this was effective as 
of January 2010 (with gradual introduction), 
the relevant decision was made back on May 
11, 2009 (i.e. during the reign of the so-called 
expert government). Later on, large-scale 
reforms were implemented 'under the table' 
by the post-2010 governments. Although the 
society experienced the parametric changes 
(restrictions), it failed to notice the point: the 
relative independence of the social security 
system within public finances came to an end 
in Hungary. They made the contributions paid 
by companies tax-like (social contribution 
tax), for which no service can be expected. 
It is specified by the act on social security 
(adopted with simple majority) as may be in 
effect from time to time, and it is financed 
by the sources firmly integrated into the 
state budget. (changing the pension act is 
possible and depends on the governments.) 
The reform of the administrative apparatus 
meant further concentration, which meant 
that the former separated social security 
funds were terminated. The insurance quality 
is now only reflected in certain calculation 
methods and in the years of service taken into 
consideration.
The implemented parametric reforms, 
including the extension of service time, the 
strong limitation of the generosity of the 
system, the termination of swiss indexation 
and making it exclusively inflation-targeting 
(as the extent of inflation is low), had a positive 
effect on the equilibrium of the pension system. 
A fair system also sustainable in the long run, 
however, has not been established. on the 
contrary, the tensions existing in the pension 
system further increased between the new and 
former pensions, especially on account of the 
unavoidable catching up of salaries. 
It must be seen, however, that the reform 
of the pension system is not only a matter of 
finances. It can be traced back to much deeper 
socio-structural changes – in practice, to the 
crisis of the basic unit of the society: the family 
(Botos K., 2016). No one has addressed this in 
relation to the reforms.
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THe bAsIs OF THe reFOrm
The problems regarding the pension system 
and demographics has been presented by 
many in various forms, both in Hungarian 
and international literature (cseh-szombathy, 
Tóth, 2001). We are not even going to attempt 
to review all these presentations. We would 
just like to focus on some simple links here.
The present pension system is not fair. It 
expressly punishes families that raise children. 
The pension of those having children is 
probably more unfavourable than that of those 
not having any children. The provision of high 
level replacement rate for elderly age, however 
odd it may sound, is one of the negative 
incentives of the system, in terms of having 
children. Having children is not indispensable 
to ensure that one can get by even at their old 
ages. 
To that end, József Botos and several other 
authors also proposed the necessity of a reform 
that takes into account children in the past 
decades (Botos J. 1998; Mészáros J., Banyár J., 
2004; schlett A. 2009, 2011; Botos J., Botos 
K., 2011; Botos K., 2009, 2011, 2012; szegő, 
Giday 2012; Banyár, Gál, Mészáros, 2016; 
Demény P. 2016; It should be noted that 
Pál Demény represented this idea in foreign 
literature before anyone else). According to 
these ideas, one of the aspects of the reform is 
indeed to make the pension system influence 
the rate of bearing children, and thus, to 
influence family and generational solidarity, 
either directly or indirectly. The society must 
accept that having children is not an individual 
hobby, but a matter of public interest. The 
children are needed by the childless, too! And 
raising the children is just as necessary for 
the operation of the entirety of the pension 
system, as the payment of contributions pro-
rated to wages.
Let’s take a closer look: why exactly is the 
reform of the pension system indispensable? 
Why is the pension system reform 
indispensable?
A person, if he works all his active life and 
takes care of his children in the meantime, 
practically only pays a few years’ extra in the 
form of contribution pro-rated to wages into 
the budget, which is used to cover his parents’ 
pension. In principle, this surplus could 
serve as the 'coverage' of his own pension. 
The person, however, lives significantly 
longer as a pensioner than these few years! 
fortunately, his children at working age start 
working themselves during the baseline 40 
years, so they pay contributions, too. This 
is what covers the pension now payable to 
their parents. (And not the pension payable 
to themselves, as suggested by the insurance 
approach.) The contribution payment of 
consecutive generations ensure the allowances 
paid to the pensioners. At a macro level, from 
the point of society, only having children is the 
basis of pension! so far, the government does 
not feel a strong urge to make a paradigmatic 
change. The relatively high replacement rate 
(ratio of pension/wage) existing in today’s 
pension system can also be sustained, which 
amounts to 80% after 40 years of service, but 
the true average is hardly 60%. The experts of 
the Hungarian National Bank take the view 
that the pension system is balanced until 2035 
(freudenberg, Berki, Reich, 2016). According 
to their calculations, there will be no problems 
with financing pensions until 2035. up to 
this point, maximum the prolongation of life 
expectancy plays a role in the increase of the 
financing need. The change in fertility, even if 
it is a positive one, is not a factor, as its impacts 
can only be felt after approx. two decades. It 
must be seen, however, that the dramatic 
impact will be felt in the long run! The 
equilibrium could only be maintained from 
a demographic point of view if citizens were 
to have children in their twenties. otherwise, 
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if the date of having children and getting 
married is deferred and the parents have 
much less than two children in average, the 
withdrawable income sufficient for covering 
the allowance payable to the elderly (living 
longer and longer) during their pensioner 
age will not be generated. This way, a deficit 
is generated in the system. The contribution-
paying generations fall out! The rate of fertility 
and the number of children born remain below 
the value necessary for reproduction! Based 
on current statistical figures, and looking way 
ahead in the future, this is the situation that 
can be expected. Although the fertility rate 
improved a bit in the past years, it is still only 
at maximum 1.5. on top of that, the date 
of having children is postponed to people’s 
early thirties. (Although the government has 
set an ambitious goal: to reach the number of 
births necessary for the reproduction of the 
population by 2030. However, we saw it that 
it could only be expected much later, in the 
decades after 2035.) Practically, the impact of 
the postponement of having children cannot 
be compensated from the perspective of 
contribution payment. The state, if it wants 
to fulfil its current pension commitments, 
has to find another source to provide social 
support to low-income elderly people, and 
must supplement the allowance from other 
state revenues.
There are some amongst the supporters 
of the children-based pension system who 
formulate their thoughts sharply and say that 
the current pension system lies: it claims that 
you are entitled to pension because you pay 
the contribution. However, the source of 
pension is only created by the children raised, 
so only they should be entitled to receive it 
(Banyár, 2019). As to the other: save up.... We 
can agree with this thought in some sense. At 
the same time, we contemplate a two-channel 
solution, for several reasons.
The level of pensions is expected to be low 
not only due to demography, but also as a 
result of the change of net wages. In the case of 
certain generations, it is only expected to reach 
30-40% of average salaries. Many people were 
employed officially for minimum wage. Also 
many people have chosen special taxation. 
There are more and more people who have 
worked their 40 years with such low taxation. 
'No matter how much KATA you pay, you won’t 
have a palpable pension. So be happy for the 
low fee of KATA, but reserve what you save on 
it for your older days' – wrote András Farkas in 
his consulting blog (farkas, 2017). Pension 
savings will be a vital issue for many!
People’s apathy towards their future is 
almost incomprehensible. They solely rely 
on 'making it somehow.' The state will do 
something eventually. They could only ensure 
their future in two ways: with savings, i.e. 
for example by paying contribution and the 
pension fund payments complementing the 
same, and by having and raising children. 
They, however, do not care for this much.  Yet, 
the expenditures that must be made for the 
future today, such as the expenditures spent 
on children or savings, cannot be escaped by 
any means. choosing the burdens coming 
with a family is not an option, but a necessity! 
This is what society should realise. To that end, 
government measures should aim to make 
family solidarity necessary and feasible and the 
same time. 
However, we cannot agree with initiatives 
urging us to transition (or return) to the 
social security system that is based exclusively 
on family solidarity. (This is what the social 
reality before the establishment of the social 
security system was like, that is when elderly 
people were maintained by their children. It 
would be quite similar if parents only received 
pension after their children.) But what would 
happen with those who do not or could 
not have children involuntarily? Not every 
childlessness is voluntary. Another problem 
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that is added to having children is that finding 
one’s partner became much more difficult 
in atomized societies. for those who want 
to have children, too. People’s willingness 
to commit has weakened a lot. on top of 
it all, infertility became an epidemic in the 
past decades. owing to the options of birth 
control, few children are born even in the 
existing relationships. Naturally, these deeper 
reasons also require analysis and solution.
There is also a possibility for the case of 
childlessness: savings. This is what the savings 
scheme built exclusively and expressly on the 
principle of capitalisation is based on. We will 
cover this in detail later on.
In the old days, children were born partly 
because there was nothing people could do 
to prevent it, and partly because descendants 
were needed for the family to get by. However, 
the conditions in society have gone through 
a fundamental change in the past century. 
Parents practically have no direct 'profit' from 
the children as labour force. Neither by using 
the work of the offspring in their own activity, 
nor by using their help in their old age. As 
a matter of fact, many times it is not even 
possible for the different generations to live in 
a community, in close physical proximity to 
each other. urbanisation brings many young 
people away from their hometowns. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to rely on 
the notion that the state social security 
system should be maintained on the basis of 
solidarity. Every citizen should be able to get 
(work)pension! They should strive to achieve 
it and it should be possible for them to do so! 
This means that we think that people should 
continue to acquire their elderly age pension 
entitlement individually with their payments 
made in their active years. This entitlement, 
however, is not based on the funding of 
their payments! The system is not covered by 
material (financial) means! (We implied that 
the amounts coming in are 'going out' or 
flowing out instantly from the state budget, in 
the form of allowance granted to the elderly.) 
If a part of the salaries paid (payment of 
contribution, social contribution) could not 
be ripped out from the income generated by 
employees, the coverage for the subsistence of 
the previous generation would not be ensured! 
Therefore, pension depends on the children 
born for the entire society! However, the rate of 
having children decreased in the past decades. 
It is clear that the birth of children depends on 
the parents’ intentions, and this intention is 
influenced by many factors, including finances, 
comfortability and social status. Therefore, it 
is important for the pension system to have 
a positive, strengthening influence on the 
willingness to have children. Practically every 
state pension insurance system is only viable if 
there is a sufficient number of children born 
in due time per each pair of parents. (It is 
important to highlight the expression 'born in 
due time'!) This means that the system is, in 
fact, based on human capital coverage.
At the same time, it is necessary to make 
active generations interested in making 
income. To that end, everyone should link 
their own pension expectations to their own 
work earnings, or, to be more accurate, to the 
payments made from such earnings. However, 
the sustainability of the system undoubtedly 
depends on whether the next active working 
generation of similar number will be born and 
raised. It depends on whether there will be a 
sufficient number of employable individuals 
in the next generation who can utilise their 
human capital for generating income. This is 
not ensured by payment of contributions in 
itself. It only entitles people to acquire a work 
pension, which, however, apparently will only 
provide a quite meager living conditions for 
citizens under the current regulation. This 
means that it is quite probable that the work 
pension will not cover one’s subsistence. As a 
result of the visible change in demographics, 
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the pension commitments corresponding to 
the current rate could only be provided with a 
substantial increase of contributions. However, 
the Hungarian government constantly tries 
to reduce the burdens of labour.  Indeed, it 
would not be proper to place heavy burdens 
on the shoulder of the active generation. The 
international competition would not allow it, 
either. Work pension must be complemented 
by having children or by savings by all means.
This revelation is still not part of public 
perception. on the contrary! Many people 
believe that those having children 'get enough 
support already.'
The current supports concentrate on 
the mitigation of burdens. families use a 
substantial part of their budget to raise their 
children, almost as a 'second contribution 
payment.' (This is why many people do not 
have children in part: a family having two 
children and working for average salaries will 
find themselves below the poverty threshold 
before they know it if they have the two 
children necessary for social reproduction.) 
People are instinctively good economists: 
their decisions are influenced by the sensible 
disadvantage. Balázs Reizer presented that 
according to his studies, the earning per person 
in families having children decreased with 
almost 20% ceteris paribus as a result of having 
children, which means an approximately 12 
unit fallback on an income scale of 100 for 
the households having their first children, and 
a fallback of 8 units in the households with 
other children (Reizer, 2011).
In the case of women, another issue to tackle 
regarding the matter of pension (which is, by 
the way, a positive trait of family support): 
the longer periods spent on maternity leave 
(receiving child home care allowance (GYEs) 
or child care fee (GYED)). János Köllői 
revealed it a decade ago (Köllői, 2008) that the 
Hungarian child support system was urging 
women with small children for a longer period 
to exit the labour market for the long term. 
Today, child care is calculated into the years 
of entitlement, yet, fall out from the labour 
market has some disadvantages. The insurance 
approach of the pension system remunerates 
this in an expressly unfavourable manner: the 
virtual allowance base will most probably be 
less than that generated in the case of workers, 
as their wage is increased during such a long 
time presumably. If, therefore, mothers could 
only expect income at their old age counting 
on their work pension, they are sure to receive 
a more unfavourable pension than childless 
people, even with the same number of active 
years. 
The work carried out in the family is not 
regarded as actual work by the members of 
the society. Yet, many researches conducted 
by TÁRKI outline that the need of children 
raised in the family for labour force reaches 
statutory working hours. This way, stay-at-
home mothers (most of the time, they are 
mothers, but this can also be interpreted for 
the other sex), as put by Zsuzsa Morvay, should 
be regarded 'incapable of work' the same 
way as if they had to stay at home for other 
reasons (Morvay, 2019). While, if someone is 
incapable of work in the Hungarian society, 
they are entitled to sickness benefits and 
pension. In both forms of care, they receive 
a much bigger rate of their salaries than the 
amount of child care support. While, her work 
performed at home is of utmost importance 
and use for the society! 
If a child goes into bad ways as a result of 
education at home, according to calculations, 
a single police measure costs the same amount 
as financing an entire year of a skilled worker 
student. We are not trying to say, of course, 
that the children of working parents go 
into bad ways in all cases. It is safe to state, 
however, that children welcomed with a hot 
meal at home, whom their parents ask about 
their day, whose social relationships are 
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supervised by the parents, whose parents help 
in their studies –  or at least supervise it – , 
and whose parents maybe also contributes in 
spending their free time in a useful manner are 
socialising differently than those who are not 
supported by their parents like this. Moreover, 
maintaining the institution system serving 
the day-time care of children also has severe 
costs. These institutions are overcrowded in 
the majority of the cases and their capacities 
are not sufficient (although their development 
is intended today). Many times, this as an 
additional reason why mothers cannot find 
a job (Blaskó et al., 2009). (Although the 
sources referenced are almost 10 years old, 
similar phenomena can still be observed in the 
current situation.)
obviously, it is not easy to quickly 
increase the amounts of family support in a 
more significant manner compared to the 
previous increases. It is a known fact that the 
generosity of Hungarian family support is also 
outstanding on a European level. (Although 
when they say this, they do not add that the 
Hungarian wages are extremely low compared 
to those in Western countries, even today, 
although some significant wage improvements 
took place in the past one or two years. Thus, 
if two incomes are needed for the family to get 
by, the higher rate child support and giving 
income to those raising children is justified, as 
one party falls out from the labour market.) 
The impact of financial support is not always 
reflected by the change of demographic 
processes distinctly. [Although surveys say that 
their withdrawal can be felt quite distinctly, 
it has a negative impact on the willingness of 
middle-class families to have children (spéder, 
2017)].
We believe, therefore, that the family costs 
spent on children should be conceived as a 
second form of contribution payment! Thus, 
the solution could be the introduction of a 
two-channel pension system.
The solution could be the introduction 
of  a two-channel pension system
If 'remunerating' having children is realised in 
the pension system in line with our proposal, 
the cost implications of this will appear in 
a delayed manner in the state budget. It is 
not a concern that we would place excessive 
burdens on the central budget in this period. 
If, however, the operation of the system 
brings about the contemplated effect, and it 
is accompanied by higher rates of child birth 
(and education), then this could create the 
basis necessary for covering the extra costs 
in the long run, exactly through the fact 
that the children raised will pay taxes and 
contributions in their working age. If these 
children are not born, there would not be tax 
and contribution payers in due number and 
in due time when the contribution must be 
paid for the benefit of the parents. This is why 
we claim that the two-channel pension system 
would be a step resulting in complex positive 
impacts by all means. It would promote 
social justice better than the current one, and 
it would have favourable impacts on both 
financial sustainability and population policy. 
This reform is necessary and possible, and, 
therefore, it is feasible! 
It is incomprehensible how it did not 
have a breakthrough on the level of politics! 
Especially because the Hungarian government 
reigning since 2010 has put a great emphasis 
on the family issue. We can only attribute this 
hesitation to the medium-term conceptual 
horizon of politics.
The introduction of the two-channel 
pension system could be the answer for the 
proposals that have been supporting the 
introduction of the so-called 'unconditional 
base income' nowadays.1 What does this have 
to do with the pension reform? If developed 
countries consider guaranteeing a minimum 
livelihood in society justified, then it should 
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not be given without any conditions, but 
should be subjected to activities or activity 
that benefits the society. Although this is a 
condition in some sense, it is a quite legitimate 
one from the point of the subsistence of the 
society. There is hardly any activity more 
useful than having and raising children. But 
we must highlight: in the pension system, they 
would only be entitled to the benefit payable 
for the children if they did indeed provide 
education to their children at least to the level 
of minimum average literacy (which means 
the acquisition of a profession or high school 
qualification today).
THe Issues OF THe cHIlDren-bAseD 
PensIOn cHAnnel
The proposed pension reform may be attacked 
exactly from the point of its conditionality. It 
may also be criticised owing to the fact that it 
considers the family as the basic unit of society 
instead of the individual. It would, indeed, 
be tied to families (at least to parent pairs). 
It would not, however, mean unconditional 
support, as it would be granted only if the 
required education has been provided to the 
children. At the same time, we suggest that it 
is worth fighting the counter-opinions of the 
proposal owing to its multidirectional positive 
impact.
first of all, the fact that it would bring 
a sustainable scheme is an unconditional 
positive element of our proposal. financial 
expenditures that are not unconditional, and, 
so, are subject to certain conditions, give 
incentive to the members of the society to find 
a permanent solution for the problem, exactly 
as a result of its conditions. The system that 
ties the pension of families to the education 
of children will result in a more qualified 
generation on a social scale. Naturally, all 
this would only increase willingness to have 
children in an indirect manner. But if the 
'return' of the sacrifice related to having 
children is reflected in pension, it would, 
presumably, increase willingness to have 
children slowly, and it would nonetheless 
promote the education of children. 
for the flexible adaptation necessary in 
modern economy, one must have a versatile 
qualification. The pension system would not 
only remunerate having children, but also 
educating them, as the urge to have children 
in itself does not guarantee a generation in 
society that will be able to hold their own on 
the labour market. Therefore, it is a substantial 
element of the proposal that it differentiates 
according to the level of qualification the 
parent pairs can provide to their children. 
This is fair. undoubtedly, providing further 
education to children in excess of vocational 
training or secondary education means 
significant costs for the family. (outstanding 
American economists Rajan, Reich and 
stiglitz prove that in the usA, young people 
with high income can owe their income to the 
fact that their parents ensured that they could 
go to the best schools possible.) 
This cost-based approach has the obvious 
disadvantage that not every training or 
education means expenditures that are truly 
necessary on the labour market. Many people 
obtain tertiary qualifications and end up 
working on different areas. If they do not find 
a job on the field of their qualifications, their 
general literacy will allow them to quickly 
adapt to other fields. According to previous 
experience, the job finding rates of human 
sciences students are not at all worse than those 
of intellectuals with other specialisations. 
This development could make the pension 
system sustainable in the long term. step by 
step, it would become clear for the members 
of the society that taking some sacrifices in 
the present may be worth for ensuring a more 
safer income at their old age. If the number 
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of children increases, and they are raised 
through education, the investment made in 
human capital will pay for everyone: both for 
the society (in tax and contribution payment) 
and for individuals, in the more favourable 
pension possibilities of people having 
children.
It is not sure that the educated child will 
make use of his skills in Hungary. This is, in 
fact, another serious problem. In the past 
decades, the Eu’s free movement of workers 
policy only resulted in Western Europe taking 
up all the labour force from the eastern areas. 
Hungary is not even in the worst situation. 
The Baltic states, Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria 'produced' even worse figures than 
Hungarian emigration. This subject poses 
the question of fairness –  on an Eu level. 
Emigration and working abroad cannot be 
approached only from the perspective of the 
individual. It is not enough either if we also 
take into consideration the positive effect 
caused by incomes potentially sent back 
home. These foreign currency amounts do, 
in fact, contribute to the improvement of 
the balance of payments in Hungary on a 
macroeconomic level, but they do not mean 
sources for the budget. Yet, a significant part 
of the costs of their training and education 
was financed by that budget. In Hungary, and 
generally across Europe, a substantial part of 
education, health care and social subsidies are 
financed from taxes and contributions. Their 
reimbursement by the rising generation to 
the budget and the community is a legitimate 
expectation. our tax and contribution 
payment obligations can also be viewed 
in this manner. If, however, someone pays 
public dues in his foreign work place, he 
contributes to the public finances of the host 
country. He/she, as an individual, will not 
suffer any disadvantages arising from this, as 
he uses the country’s infrastructure and he 
will receive his pension from that country 
pro-rated to the work he has done there. 
The country, however, where he was raised 
and educated, will suffer the impacts of the 
payments missing from the large systems.
Different principles prevail across the 
Eu at the moment, with the individualist 
insurance approach being the most dominant 
one. 'I save for myself', so it does not matter 
where, in which country and with what kind 
of work I collect my pension elements. What I 
have worked in another country, I will receive 
from there. This approach is completely 
appropriate for those interested in mobility. 
At the same time, it is in opposition with the 
reform we propose in the pension system. 
social reproduction based on families starts 
from the premise that with their contribution 
payment, the active generation of parents 
is, on the one hand, 'repaying' the 'human 
capital investments' invested in them by the 
grandparents. Therefore, citizens invest in 
their children, and as the state of the specific 
country also contributes to this investment 
from public funds, return should also be 
examined on the level of the country.
Without making this investment approach 
general in theory, it will not be easy to establish 
a coordinated practice in the Eu. Naturally, the 
coordination of this system with the basically 
individualist pension insurance system of 
other countries means a difficult diplomatic 
task. This difficulty, however, cannot be an 
obstacle for Hungary to introduce a family-
based system, serving the persistence of the 
country’s population.
Moreover, anyone would be right to say 
that the family-based pension system does 
not acknowledge the fact the family in its 
traditional sense is on the verge of disappearing 
all across Europe. The disruption of marriages 
and relationships is, indeed, a problem that 
we must face (as we have already suggested 
this before). It is a fact that a quite significant 
part of children (almost half of them) are born 
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out of wedlock today, even in Hungary. The 
institution of marriage is often replaced with 
domestic partnership. can a system based on 
the costs of having and educating children be 
interpreted amongst these conditions?
The first question to ask is whether this 
phenomenon (even if it is a fact) is good for 
society. Above all: is it good for the children 
themselves? of course, it is not (fagan, 2012). 
should the elimination of marriages, or at least, 
the reduction of their number be regarded as 
a trend that is an irreversible legality? It may 
serve as an encouragement that according to 
recently published data, after long periods of 
continuous decline, the number of marriages 
started to grow in Hungary once again. This 
means that marriage is not necessarily an 
institution that is 'going extinct.' We should 
not, therefore, start from the premise that the 
tendencies of processes in the society cannot 
change due to some fatalism. It is certain that 
it is necessary to realise for a positive change 
that the mass disruption of marriages have a 
negative effect on both the individual life of 
the children to be born as well as on the future 
of the society. Therefore, the institutional 
changes that promote the stabilisation of 
marriages are useful. (This topic goes far 
beyond the subject of this study, i.e. the 
organisation of the pension system.)
The problems related to demographic 
developments, even if they complicate the 
situation, are not unresolvable from the point 
of the pension reform proposal. It does not 
force the keeping together of bad marriages. 
If the divorced person fulfils his or her fair 
obligation to pay child support, then the 
amount spent on the child can be taken into 
consideration in his or her case, too. It is true, 
however, that the 'unpaid work' done in the 
household is not taken into account amongst 
the 'sacrifice elements' of child care (it cannot 
necessarily be taken into account either in the 
case of 'child points' accurately). The effective 
expenditures meaning the average costs of 
raising a child, however, can be specified 
accurately. Based on the foregoing, therefore, 
divorced parents who pay child support 
properly could also get 'scores' in the system 
proposed by us.
Another expected objection against the 
proposal is that it is unfavourable for the 
childless. This, however, is simply not true! 
It can be warded off with a relatively simple 
explanation, as it is obvious that one who does 
not have children does not spend on them 
either. In opposition to his fellow citizen who 
has children, he can save this amount in order 
to ensure the safety of his elderly days, and, 
in fact, he must save it! This way, the pension 
system could be based on two channels in 
all cases. Paying contribution out of our 
monetary income is only one of the channels. 
The other channel is the ratio of income spent 
on children. If I do not have to spend on 
them, I can save it. This is the second channel 
for the childless. The society must reach a 
level of awareness where people think about 
their future safety from the earliest days of 
their working age, in excess of their pension 
received after their work. This system, or, to 
be more accurate, the further development of 
saving schemes with pension purposes must be 
implemented as soon as possible. 
We can say, with the criticism coming 
from the other side, that this solution makes 
being childless an easy choice. Yet, the birth 
of unwanted children is by no means an aim 
of this proposal. The system does not coerce 
people to have unwanted children. This would 
be the worst for the children themselves. 
However, the reform would benefit anyone 
who wants to have children in comparison 
to today’s (unjust) system. our proposal is 
expressly aimed at making the decision to have 
children easier for those who want to have 
children. At the same time, there should be a 
solution for the childless, too.
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revIeW OF vOlunTAry sAvIng 
scHemes
Anett Pandurits gives an excellent review on 
the existing schemes of pension savings in 
Hungary (Pandurits, 2017). she shows that 
almost every savings arrangement enjoys some 
form of state subsidy. Not only in Hungary, 
but in other countries in the world, too.
savings arrangements should undergo a 
comprehensive review, primarily from the 
perspective that the state should only support 
the long-term schemes that are aimed at pension 
savings. (The remaining savings arrangements 
are based on personal considerations and 
primarily serve the interest of the financial 
sector. The necessity of savings has been 
presumably made clear to the population by 
the past thirty years of the market economy.) As 
it could be read in the referenced publication 
of the insurance expert, the Hungarian pension 
fund scheme is a special combination of the 
open institutions known in the West and the 
closed ones. In Hungary, general social care 
prevails. (In the current pension fund saving 
schemes, it is possible to use the amounts for 
purposes other than pension.) In the case of 
the categorisation and review of savings plans, 
it should be achieved that instead of being 
directed by the lobby interest of the sector, it 
should be carried out by independent persons 
with, as the Anglo-saxon put it, academic-
university or research background. for this, 
sources independent from the financial sector 
(state, foundation, research) must be provided, 
also avoiding political overtones at the same 
time. However, to what extent can pension 
savings be based on voluntary basis is an 
important question. As far as we are concerned, 
we would like to build on voluntary savings in 
the case of the childless. on the one hand, in 
order to avoid any references to the unsuccessful 
'mandatory.' The infamous former  second 
pillar is still considered by many as 'the state 
took our savings'. This could influence the fate 
of every reform proposal related to savings.
We would like to believe that the Hungarian 
society is of full age. We would like to believe 
that the people are able to identify their 
own interest with sufficient clarification and 
information. unfortunately, this assumption 
does not always hold its own. We may seem 
idealist in this sense. Perhaps there should be 
some form of mandatory savings obligation. 
There are a lot of misconceptions in people’s 
heads. Probably because the pension savings 
would be dominated by an atmosphere of 
distrust, it would not matter that this time 
it would be a newer and improved version 
entrenched with guarantees. In light of the 
foregoing, a comprehensive change could only 
be started with extremely careful preparation 
and communication strategy. 
To that end, it is possible that some kind of 
'mandatory', but at least automatic, element 
should be integrated into the system. for 
instance in the manner Nobel prize winning 
Thaler proposed it. The essence is that the 
mandatory nature would be resolved by making 
entrance into the savings scheme automatic for 
everyone. But they could exit if they wanted 
to. so it would not be mandatory by all means. 
According to Thaler, however, being aware of 
the stress of powerlessness occurring in people, 
the majority of them would not make the 
efforts needed for exiting. This way, the system 
could qualify as voluntary, but hopefully it 
would still ensure the necessary large numbers 
of participants. (The brief summary of the 
proposal can be read in Peter E. Ear’s review 
on Thaler; Peter E. Ear, 2018)
It is, indeed, owned by the payer
Why is it unambiguous that the proposed 
private savings is different than the previous 
second pillar aimed at pension savings? first 
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of all, it would not be redirected from the 
mandatory contribution payment. This is the 
essence! It would mean extra savings from the 
wage of employees in excess of contribution 
payment. This immediately raises the question 
whether young people will be able to save extra 
amounts especially from their starting salaries 
for such distant goals. Especially considering 
that renting an apartment costs fortunes today. 
still, we think that even if with a small starting 
sum, savings should be started at an early age. 
This voluntary pension fund scheme does, in 
fact, resemble the former second pillar in that 
they both are asset-based funded schemes that 
would be owned by the payer. The question is: 
can the trust of Hungarian citizens be earned 
for this scheme? (It must be highlighted by 
all means that this scenario is, indeed, about 
savings generated from net income, which 
cannot be taken away from citizens, as opposed 
to the redirection of the second pillar, which 
was not, in fact, the money saved for financing 
themselves, but the part of contribution 
payable to the people raising them.)
 our proposal, nonetheless, connects the 
system with demography, which is a crucial 
issue from the point of the subsistence of 
Hungarian society. finally, we came to the 
conclusion that Hans-Werner Sinn did: a 
complex system is needed, which combines the 
pay-as-you-go system with the children channel 
(sinn, 2001; 2004). It combines the dividing-
imposing work pension systems with a human 
capital-based and/or asset-based scheme. our 
proposal is, therefore, to complement the 
current work pension scheme (or a better, 
score-system version of it), which could only 
provide low income at elderly age according 
to current calculations, with a children-based 
second pension channel, and, in the case of 
the childless, with an asset-based pension fund 
channel. It could be an interesting proposal 
that the two forms (pension savings and having 
children, as pension funds) could even provide 
a possibility of transitioning from one to the 
other. (Especially if the pension savings were 
compelled by laws.) for example, every first-
time employee would start the (mandatory) 
private savings, the extent of which could only 
be reduced pro rata when the employee found 
his/her partner and started to have children. 
In the case of three children, the burdens of 
this (forced) savings arrangement could be 
practically eliminated 'on the go', similarly to 
the debt of housing loans taken out for having 
children, and so the person could transition to 
the children-based scheme. Instead of pension 
fund savings, citizens could be entitled to 
pension on the basis of their children, as those 
having children would 'fulfil' the savings with 
bearing the costs of having the children (what 
they have saved so far would be owned by them 
by all means). It should be decided whether this 
form should remain available for those wishing 
to keep it (as they can afford to pay it), as a form 
of complementary pension insurance. But it 
should not be mandatory for them, if it brings 
burdens, because they have to spend on their 
children on a continuous basis, too.
The question how the basic pension (work 
pension) itself could be reformed into a more 
just and reasonable solution (for example 
by making the old and new pensions more 
proportionate, etc.) would be the subject 
of a different study. However, the two-
fold addition: the child-based channel and 
the pension savings scheme would provide 
a desired, necessary and just solution for 
everyone, including the childless. And, as such, 
it should be decided by politics whether the 
preparations of the reform should be started.
summAry
A paradigm shift is needed in the pension 
system. The insurance paradigm must be 
changed to an investment paradigm, and, 
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basically to the return of the investment 
into human capital. It must be made clear: 
we don’t 'save' for our older selves, we repay 
our predecessors what they invested in us. 
However, in the case of the calculation method 
of the basic state pension, the entitlement for 
future work pension would still be determined 
based on the amount one could expect pro-
rated to their contribution payment, assuming 
forty years of service. Therefore, work pension 
would remain pro-rated to income. It would, 
however, be complemented by the second 
channel payable based on children or based 
on the voluntary pension fund. The proposed 
pension reform would be important primarily 
because it would result in greater justice. It 
would, however, be a viable step. It would not 
place burdens on the budget in the present. It 
could have a significant role in strengthening 
family solidarity. In the longer term, it would 
also influence the equilibrium of the pension 
system. The appropriate forms of social 
communication could be found for it without 
a doubt.
Note
1 The concept of unconditional basic income is 
a concept that has existed level for long on an 
international level. (There was already a referen-
dum about it in switzerland.) If consumption 
cannot increase, economic growth may also slow 
down. There is a lot of truth in these opinions. 
It is not a coincidence that Nobel prize-wining 
economist Joseph stiglitz or leading American 
economist Robert Reich also emphasize (stiglitz, 
2015; Reich, 2017) that the direct support 
provided to poorer layers of the society is more 
useful for the economy than the tax allowance, 
which is applied in Hungary, too. Taxes can 
be paid by those who have (perhaps higher) 
income. Wealthier people, however, increase their 
consumption to a smaller extent than the poorer. 
These economists claim that as a result, from the 
point of growth, it is more efficient to allocate the 
subsidies to the poorer directly than to allocate 
them indirectly to the wealthier through the taxes.
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